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Abstract: 
 
Drawing on family business studies and the knowledge-based view of economic growth, we 
develop and test a model of how the prevalence of small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) 
under family control affects economic growth. Specifically, we propose there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between family SMEs’ proportional representation and economic growth 
owing to their relative strengths and limitations vis-a`-vis non-family SMEs. Using state-level 
data from the US between 2004 and 2010, we find support for our hypothesis and the underlying 
contention that economic growth is maximized when an economy includes a balanced mix of 
family and non-family SMEs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic growth is defined as the increase in the output of an economy, reflecting its capacity 
to produce goods and services (Barro 1991). Theories of economic growth largely recognize that 
newly created and small- to medium-size enterprises (SME) (i.e., firms with <500 employees) 
are the engines of economic growth, as they create jobs, spark competition, and promote 
innovation and knowledge spillovers, all of which stimulate economic growth in a society (Acs 
and Szerb 2007; Audretsch 2007; Rothwell and Zegveld 1982; 
Schumpeter 1934). 
 
Research has indicated that family involvement among SMEs is prevalent (Schulze and 
Gedajlovic 2010; La Porta et al. 1999).1 Studies also show that family SMEs have different 
organizational goals, resources, risk-taking propensities, and investment horizons from non-
family SMEs (e.g., Becchetti and Trovato 2002; Donckels and Frochlich 1991; Kotlar et al. 
2014; Sharma, Chrisman and Chua 1997). Studies have underscored family SMEs’ prevalence in 
local economies (e.g., Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Chang et al. 2008; Shanker and Astrachan 
1996), yet how and to what extent the prevalence of family SMEs contribute to economic growth 
is still largely unknown. Thus, a better understanding of how the prevalence of family SMEs 
influences economic growth will contribute to both family business research and public policy 
making (Audretsch 2007). 
 
Prior literature draws attention to both reinforcing (e.g., Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Benedict 
1968; Bjuggren et al. 2011; Khalaf and Shwayri 1966; Westhead and Howorth 2007) and 
retarding effects (e.g., Morck et al. 1998; Morck and Yeung 2003, 2004) of family firms on 
economic growth around the world. By drawing on family business studies and the knowledge-
based view of economic growth, we examine the impact of the prevalence of family SMEs on 
economic growth at the state level in the USA. We chose to study the relationship between the 
prevalence of family firms and economic growth in the USA for the following reasons. First, 
idiosyncratic strategies, variations in knowledge stocks, and high competition that would 
stimulate imitation are characteristic of the US market (Knott 2003). Thus, the USA is an 
appropriate context to test our theory centered in knowledge heterogeneity and knowledge 
spillover. Second, there is a sufficient disparity in economic growth and types of firms across the 
states in the USA to make our analysis meaningful.  Third, there is nevertheless a reasonable 
degree of homogeneity in other factors, such as culture and legal regimes that might influence 
economic growth, to ensure that the possible confounds to our analysis are minimized. Finally, 
the size of the USA ensured that we were able to collect enough data for our study. 
 
We suggest that the prevalence of family firms will have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
economic growth. Put differently, we theorize that economic growth is optimized when it 
includes both family and non-family firms. The contention that a mix of family and non-family 
SMEs is more conducive for economic growth than either type of firm alone is consistent with 
the idea that a certain degree of heterogeneity and variety of organizational forms is beneficial to 
the productive potential of a regional economy (Knott 2003; Wennekers and Thurik 1999). The 
findings of our analyses based on longitudinal data obtained from the Small Business 
Development Center (SBDC) program, US Census, and US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
support our hypothesis. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we extend the knowledge-
based view of economic growth by explicitly recognizing family involvement as an important 
dimension of heterogeneity among SMEs, which is expected to increase economic growth. 
Second, we consider both the strengths and limitations of family SMEs to argue that the impact 
of family SMEs is neither purely positive nor negative, but rather that the composition of SMEs 
is what matters in the economy. Third, the results of our study contribute to the literature by 
providing support for the hypothesis that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
prevalence of family SMEs and economic growth. In short, we contribute to an improved 
understanding of the role of family firms in promoting economic growth. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present our theory, hypothesis, methodology, and results, 
followed by a discussion of the implications and limitations of our study. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis 
 
Numerous studies indicate the importance of SMEs to economic growth (e.g., Thurik and 
Wennekers 2004; Wennekers and Thurik 1999). The literature often highlights that SMEs differ 
from their large peers in terms of job creation, strategic flexibility, and innovation (Audretsch 
2007). In turn, economies with more SMEs are found to be more competitive and with higher 
growth rates than those with fewer SMEs (Audretsch et al. 2006). 
 
 
 
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of family and non-family firms in sample 
 
Recent research acknowledges that besides the direct effects caused by their inherent attributes, 
SMEs may also have indirect effects on economic growth due to competition and cooperation 
among SMEs or between SMEs and larger organizations (Audretsch 2007). In this regard, 
studies are starting to recognize the roles of knowledge asymmetries and knowledge spillovers in 
the interactions between firms (Acs et al. 2009; Audretsch and Feldman 1996). Knowledge 
asymmetry refers to the fact that market competitors often vary with respect to their stocks of 
knowledge as well as their recognition and usage of those stocks (Audretsch 2007). Knowledge 
spillover suggests that given variant knowledge stocks in a market, knowledge may spillover 
from those with high stocks to those with low stocks (Agarwal et al. 2007). In turn, knowledge 
spillovers may spur competition and innovation (Agarwal et al. 2004; Knott 2003). 
 
Knott (2003) further argues that the presence of a few large corporations with numerous small 
firms brings variations in knowledge stocks, suggesting that the superior knowledge stocks in 
large firms may spill over to small firms, thereby improving their R&D productivities. Indeed, to 
maintain a sustainable economy, it is important to have an ‘‘optimal proportion’’ of both large 
and small firms (Wennekers and Thurik 1999; Thurik and Wennekers 2004). While this line of 
research largely focuses on firm size, Knott (2003) also notes that other dimensions of hetero- 
geneity such as national origin (Acs et al. 2007), functional competence (Hoopes et al. 2003), 
and firm age  (Agarwal  et  al.  2004)  can lead to knowledge asymmetry among market 
competitors. This then fuels diffusion of knowledge across firms (knowledge spillover), which 
subsequently erodes the position of market leaders and stimulates competition in the creation of 
knowledge. In sum, an economy with heterogeneous firms is generally more innovative and 
more competitive, both of which positively relate to economic growth. As discussed below, we 
extend this reasoning to theorize that heterogeneous governance structures, specifically those 
based on family and non- family control, also facilitate economic growth. 
 
2.1 Family SME’s and economic growth 
 
Although scholars generally agree on the prevalence of the family form of organization 
(Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Chang et al. 2008; Gersick et al. 1997; Tagiuri and Davis 1996), 
the link between the prevalence of family firms and economic growth is still not clear. Given the 
distinctions in their behaviors and performance, it follows that the impact of family and non-
family firms on economic growth is also likely to differ. Family firms have both functional (e.g., 
resource providing and cost reducing) and dysfunctional characteristics (e.g., innovation 
aversion) that do not necessarily depend upon differences in size, age, or industry, which are 
instead thought to be a function of the unique characteristics of family firms (e.g., Gedajlovic 
and Carney 2010; Pollak 1985). Indeed, as shown in Table 1, family and non-family firms are 
not greatly dissimilar in these characteristics. 
 
2.1.1 Reinforcing effects of family involvement in SME’s 
 
The effects of family firm prevalence on economic growth   can   be   either   reinforcing   or   
retarding, depending on the mix of family and non-family firms in an economy. In this section, 
we argue that family involvement in SMEs may have several positive effects on firm 
performance and economic growth. In the next section, we discuss their retarding effects. 
First, family involvement can provide the resources and capital that facilitate venture creation 
and success (c.f., Habbershon and Williams 1999). Such resources may take the forms of human 
capital (Dyer 2003), social capital (Arregle et al. 2007), and physical and financial assets 
(Aldrich and Cliff 2003), which ventures created by entrepreneurs without family ties are less 
likely to possess or be able to imitate. For example, recent research suggests that teams com- 
posed of couples are more likely to achieve first sales than those composed of unrelated partners 
or individuals with biological linkages (Brannon et al. 2013). However, biologically linked teams 
that made large financial investments in a venture were also found to be successful. Furthermore, 
family involvement may provide survivability capital for the firm (Sirmon and Hitt 2003) and 
increase the stability of the economy, especially in scarce environments (Carney 2005). 
 
Second,  owing  to  a  desire  for  transgenerational sustainability, family firms tend to be 
oriented toward the long term, which provides them with advantages in terms  of  continuity,  
perseverance,  and  self-control (James 1999; Lumpkin and Brigham 2011). Higher and steadier 
long-term performance is often the consequence if concerns for the past and future do not 
obscure the needs of the present (Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2011)  
 
Third, family owners and managers tend to be more parsimonious in the use of firm assets 
because they are spending their own money (Carney (2005). Further- more, family control can 
reduce agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and management, because 
owners (principals) and managers (agents) are either the same individuals or are members of the 
same family (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983). Although some scholars point out that asymmetric 
altruism among members of the owning family may lead to different sorts of agency problems 
(e.g., Schulze et al. 2001), the received wisdom is that aggregate agency costs are lower in 
family SMEs than non-family SMEs (Chrisman et al. 2004). Although there is a tendency to 
focus on how increases in effectiveness through product innovation increases economic growth, 
higher levels of productive or transaction efficiencies can achieve the same end (Chang et al. 
2008; Schumpeter 1934) of employees, particularly family employees, in family business 
(Colombo et al. 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011). Put differently, knowledge spillover is further 
limited due to labor immobility in family SMEs. Taking both together suggests that even if 
family SMEs are heterogeneous regarding their knowledge stocks, knowledge spillover between 
family SMEs is still less likely due to limited knowledge mobility. 
 
2.1.2 Retarding effects of family involvement in SMEs 
 
Since family SMEs have unique advantages, the growth of an economy that relies excessively 
upon non-family SMEs is likely to be stifled. Nevertheless, an excessive reliance on family 
SMEs is not optimal either: Family SMEs have some offsetting limitations that suggest they are 
not a panacea. In addition, these retarding effects of family involvement are more salient when 
non-family SMEs are absent. Thus, consistent with the idea that a certain degree of heterogeneity 
and variety of SMEs is beneficial to the productive potential of a regional economy (Knott 2003; 
Wennekers and Thurik 1999); in this section, we argue that economic growth is maximized when 
there is a balanced mix of family and non-family SMEs. 
 
In general, family SMEs are less innovative com- pared to non-family SMEs (Chrisman et al. 
2015; Classen et al. 2014; De Massis et al. 2013a; Gómez- Mejía et al. 2011) because of inertia, 
lack of specialized talent, emotional ties with existing products and assets, traditions restricting 
change, reluctance to risk the family’s reputation, unwillingness to use external financing, and 
inefficient use of firms resources when there is high emphasis on preservation of socioemotional 
wealth (e.g., König et al. 2013; Gómez- Mejía et al. 2010; Schepers et al. 2014). As revealed by 
Carney (2005), when technological development is critical for success, family firms often face 
difficulties. Hence family SMEs, in turn, can hamper economic growth. 
 
It should be noted that the retarding effect (less innovation) becomes more salient when family 
SMEs become more dominant in an economy for two reasons. First, due to their reluctance to 
innovate, family firms are less likely to generate new knowledge. Indeed, family firms are often 
stuck in their traditional routines and approaches, being slower in recognizing the emergence of 
new technologies (König et al. 2013). Hence, knowledge asymmetry among firms becomes 
limited when family involvement is dominant in SMEs. Second, from a knowledge-based view, 
family SMEs are endowed with tacit, non-codifiable and socially complex knowledge, which is 
difficult to be learned or imitated by competitors (Cabrera-Suárez et al. 2001). In addition, 
emotional ties among family members and strong identification with the firm often restrict the 
mobility of employees, particularly family employees, in family business (Colombo et al. 2014; 
Gómez- Mejía et al. 2011). Put differently, knowledge spillover is further limited due to labor 
immobility in family SMEs. Taking both together suggests that even if family SMEs are 
heterogeneous regarding their knowledge stocks, knowledge spillover between family SMEs is 
still less likely due to limited knowledge mobility. 
 
2.1.3 Interaction between family and non-family SMEs 
 
Given family SMEs’ reinforcing and retarding effects on economic growth, one would 
intuitively assume that a moderate level of family SMEs’ prevalence in a local economy would 
maximize economic growth. Family firms should be more resilient to economic shocks and 
better able to overcome liabilities of newness owing to their unique access to human, social, and 
financial capital through family involvement (Chrisman et al. 2011).  The combination of 
ownership and control should also reduce agency costs, increase the importance of sustainable 
long- term performance, and yet provide greater flexibility to make rapid decisions (Carney 
2005). On the other hand, non-family SMEs should be more innovative and have higher levels of 
knowledge stocks. This, in combination with weaker knowledge mobility, barriers in non-family 
firms can provide the knowledge spillovers needed to instigate innovation in family SMEs, 
especially when their survival is threatened. Theory suggests that family firms should be better 
implementers of discontinuous technologies than non- family firms (König et al. 2013); indeed, 
research has found that when performance is below aspirations, family firms increase their R&D 
investments more than non-family firms (Chrisman  and  Patel  2012; Gómez- Mejía et al. 2011; 
Kotlar et al. 2014). 
 
Thus, based on the idea that family and non-family firms have countervailing strengths and 
weaknesses and that heterogeneity stimulates innovation and economic growth (Knott 2003), we 
propose that a nonlinear inverted U-shaped relationship will exist between the proportion of 
family SMEs and a region’s economic growth. 
 
Hypothesis There is an inverted U-shaped relation- ship between the proportion of family SMEs 
in an economy and economic growth. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To test our hypothesis, we collected secondary data from a variety of sources, including the US 
Census, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Vital Statistics System. Our primary 
information source for estimating the proportion of family SMEs is the Small Business 
Development Center (SBDC) Program in the USA. SBDCs exist in each of the states and 
territories in the USA, and their client base has generally been found to be representative of the 
population of such firms (Chang et al. 2008; Chrisman et al. 2012). Hence, SBDC clients are an 
appropriate sampling frame for investigating the prevalence of family firms and their effects on 
local economies. The SBDC conducts annual surveys on the economic impact of its counseling 
services, which are sent to the entire population of its clients in the USA who received at least 5 
h of assistance. 
 
There were 50,067 responses to the SBDC’s surveys over the period from 2005 to 2009. The 
effective response rate was approximately 18 %. Excluding clients who did not start business left 
us with 39,963 observations. In order to test for potential non-response bias, the respondents are 
divided into early and late respondents based on when they responded to the questionnaire. There 
were no statistically significant differences between these groups of respondents based on t tests; 
therefore, non-response bias does not appear to be a significant problem in this study (Kanuk and 
Berenson 1975; Oppenheim 1966). 
 
It should be noted that we aggregate our independent variable according to state- and year-level 
observations. In order to ensure an adequate number of responses per state and per year, we set 
response thresholds from each state for each year. For instance, for our primary analysis, we 
exclude state–year observations with <50 responses with complete data. After excluding 
observations with missing data, we obtained 121 longitudinal state–year observations for further 
analysis. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable 
 
We use the year-on-year log difference in gross state product (GSP) per capita (measured in 
thousand dollars) as the measure of economic growth in a state for the years 2006–2010. The log 
difference of GSP per capita (measured in thousand dollars) captures the growth or decline of the 
regional economy. We also use the percentage change in GSP per capita and the absolute value 
of GSP per capita in our robustness tests. 
 
3.2 Independent variable 
 
The independent variable in our analysis is the prevalence of family SMEs in each state for each 
year analyzed. Two steps were necessary to make this estimate because the source of ownership 
is not tracked in any publicly available data source. Even the SBDC does not directly provide 
any information on the prevalence of family firms per state and per year. Therefore, we use the 
aggregate of firm-level data in the SBDC survey database to create measures of family firm 
density per state per year (Chang et al. 2008). 
 
In the first step, we classified each firm as a family or non-family SME. We based the 
classification on family ownership, family management, and intention for intra-family succession 
to distinguish family from non-family firms (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2012). The SBDC survey 
includes questions regarding the pro- portion of the firm owned by the founder and other family 
members, number of family managers, and whether the family holds an intention for intra-family 
succession. Following Chua et al. (1999), we operationalized family firms as those with a 
minimum of 50 % family ownership, at least one family manager and a manifest intention for 
intra-family succession. As will be further explained below, we also operationalized family firms 
by ownership only, using thresholds of 50 and 100 % family ownership, for robustness tests. 
 
Second, the prevalence of family SMEs in each state per year was calculated by dividing the 
number of family SMEs by the number of all firms. The proportion of family firms per state and 
per year was used as the independent variable. As noted above, to obtain an optimal balance 
between the number of responses per state and the size of the sample available for analysis, we 
include only those states where at least 50 responses were obtained in a given year. We chose 50 
as the cutoff because it maximized the trade-off between the number of states included and the 
number of firms per state. Robustness tests were conducted using 40 and 60 respondent 
minimums. A 1-year lag was used between the time period to measure the independent variable 
and the time period for the dependent variable; hence, our independent variables cover the period 
from 2005 to 2009. After these two steps, it is found that the proportion of family firms in each 
state ranged from 18.2 to 66.7 %, with a mean of 43.7 % and standard deviation of 10.9 %. 
Given the restrictions used to define family firms, these percent- ages are lower than might be 
expected. However, when we relaxed the criteria used to define family firms in the robustness 
tests, the proportion of family firms increased, similar to what has been seen in other studies 
(e.g., Chang et al. 2008; Shanker and Astrachan 1996; Westhead and Howorth 2007). 
 
We subsequently squared the variable measuring the prevalence of family SMEs and used that as 
an additional independent variable in order to test our hypothesis concerning the nonlinear, 
inverted U-shaped relationship between family SMEs and economic growth. 
 
3.3 Control variables  
 
We used several controls in our analysis. Except where specified, each control was measured 1 
year prior to the dependent variable. The size of a state’s population may impact economic 
growth as larger populations offer more business opportunities (Chrisman et al. 1992). We used 
the number of residents per state and per year as the measure of population, obtained from the 
US Census. This variable was transformed using the natural logarithm in order to ensure 
normality. 
 
Scholars have pointed out that economic growth is path dependent, meaning that the previous 
economic condition of a region may affect subsequent economic growth (Author 1994). We 
control for economic conditions by including the log of GSP per capita from 2004 to 2008. In 
order not to overlap with our measure of economic growth, we calculated economic conditions 1 
year prior to the base year of the measure of economic growth (e.g., economic condition is the 
log of GSP per capita in year t - 2; economic growth is the log difference in GSP per capita 
between years t and t - 1). This control also minimizes potential problems of reverse causality in 
our analysis (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). 
 
The service industry sector is important for economic growth (Fuchs 1968). We measured this 
variable as the proportion of service firms in the small business population firms per state and 
per year. Again, the data were obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis database. 
Economic growth may be affected by the financial industry in a region that can facilitate the 
mobilization of capital (Hicks 1969) and fund entrepreneurial ventures with innovative products 
and production processes (Schumpeter 1934). We control for the prosperity of the financial 
industry by using the percentage of GSP accounted for by banks in each state. There is an 
increasing recognition that health care is becoming more important in regional economies around 
the USA (Harkavy and Zuckerman 1999). In addition, health care is an institutional concern 
representing the overall development of social welfare in a region. We therefore control for this 
using the percentage of GSP accounted for by healthcare. We also control for the potential 
influence of government administration on economic growth, measured as the percentage of GSP 
accounted for by public administration expenditures. Indeed, government administration may 
greatly impact the choice of institutional policy making. Overall, we intentionally choose these 
variables as they capture the heterogeneity of regions/periods in terms of administrative, 
institutional, and economic distinctions. 
 
3.4 Instrumental variables 
 
It is necessary to control for endogeneity because the results could be affected by reverse 
causality or latent factors that are not included in the model. We use the following methods to 
control for endogeneity. Firstly, we use a 1-year time lag between the measurement of our 
dependent and other variables in our panel regression. This partially ensures that the direction of 
the causal relationship is as we hypothesize, hence reducing the odds that the focal variable 
(family business) may be endogenously driven (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). Secondly, noting 
that the dependent variable is measured as the log difference of GSP per capita between t and t - 
1, we intentionally include the log of GSP per capita in t - 2 as a control, which further reduces 
the impact of endogeneity by guarding against the possibility of reverse causality (Hamilton and 
Nickerson 2003). Lastly, we select instrumental variables that are strongly related to the 
independent variable (family SMEs prevalence) but unrelated to the dependent variable 
(economic growth). We select three instrumental variables for this study. First, we include the 
change in divorce rate based on provisional counts of divorces by state of occurrence, obtained 
from National Vital Statistics System. This variable is measured as change in the percentage of 
divorced individuals in the population. Second, we include migration, calculated as the 
proportion of new migrants into a state to the overall population for each year. We obtained data 
on migration from the US Census. Third, we include ethnicity, measured as the proportion of 
white non-Hispanics per state and per year as a control variable, obtained from the US Census. 
All three variables capture factors related to the types and stability of families in a given region 
and should therefore be more strongly correlated with the proportion of family firms in a region 
than the economic growth of a region. 
 
Following Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), we use a two-stage regression approach with 
instrumental variables. In the first stage, the three instruments and controls were used to estimate 
the prevalence of family SMEs. In the second stage, the dependent variable (economic growth) 
was regressed against the predicted family SMEs prevalence obtained in the first stage, the 
squared value of that variable, and the control variables. 
 
4. Results 
 
 
The approach to measuring the dependent, independent, and control variables used in this study 
is summarized in Table 2. The means and standard deviations of each variable as well as the 
correlation matrix are shown in Table 3. 
 
Due to the longitudinal structure of data, ordinary least square regression may provide biased 
estimates. Compared to ordinary least square regression, panel regression is preferred to analyze 
longitudinal data, as it provides a better explanation concerning causal relationships from past to 
present. Fixed effects panel regression can control for unobservable cross-sectional 
characteristics (Frye 2004), and it has been applied in previous family business studies (Chen 
and Hsu 2009). Hence, we control for fixed effects of cross sections—namely states—in this 
analysis. The Hausman test revealed that there was no significant difference between fixed- and 
random-effect models (Chi-square = 63.23, p value<0.001). Thus, we used the more robust 
fixed-effect panel regression for our analysis. We also used the Huber–White sandwich estimator 
(clustered at the state level) to control for potential serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Arellano 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, we present our main analysis using family ownership, family management, 
and intra-family succession intention as the criteria to classify family firms, and 50 minimum 
responses per state and per year as the cutoff to calculate the ratio of family SMEs per state and 
per year. We relax these restrictions in the robustness tests. Table 4 shows the results of the two-
stage regression analysis. In the first stage, change in divorce rate (B = -4.90, p<0.01), migration 
rate (B = -4.22, p<0.05), and ethnicity (B = 3.66, p<0.05) prove to be good predictors of the 
prevalence of family SMEs. Taken together, this suggests that our selection of instrumental 
variables is appropriate to control for endogeneity in this analysis. 
 
 
 
The second stage uses the predicted family business prevalence obtained from the first stage and 
its squared term as the independent variables. Overall, the within R2 is 0.49, and the model is 
significant (log likelihood = 536.44, F-statistic = 2.44, p \ 0.001). Among the control variables, 
past economic status (B = -0.29; p \ 0.10) has a significant negative relationship with regional 
economic growth. In sup- port of H1, the family SME prevalence variable is positive and 
significant (B = 0.01112; p<0.05), while its square is negative and significant (B = -0.00013; p \ 
0.01).2 The inflection point of the inverted U-shaped relationship between family firm ratio and 
regional economic growth is found at 42.8 % [0.01112/(2*0.00013)], which is calculated based 
on the first derivative of the estimate of family SME prevalence and family SME prevalence 
squared. 
 
 
 
4.1 Robustness test 
 
As mentioned above, we conducted various robustness tests to ensure that our results were not an 
artifact of the restrictions we placed in the sample. First, we altered the number of minimum 
respondents per state. As shown in Table 5, when using 40 or 60 respondents as the cutoff points, 
the results are similar to our main analysis and supportive of the hypothesized inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the prevalence of family SMEs and regional economic growth. Second, we 
changed the measure of economic growth from the log difference of GSP per capita to the 
percentage change in GSP per capita between t and t - 1. As shown in Table 5, the results using 
minimum samples of 40, 50, and 60 firms are consistent with our main analysis.3 We also use the 
unadjusted value of GSP per capita as the dependent variable.4 In this regard, both GSP per 
capita in t - 1 and t - 2 are included as control variables. Again the results are consistent with our 
primary findings. Third, we tested our base model using the actual rather than predicted values of 
the prevalence of family SMEs. Again, for both economic growth measures (log difference or 
percentage change in GSP per capita) with the minimum cutoff of 40, 50, and 60, regression 
results are consistent with our primary analysis. Fourth, as noted before, we use thresholds of 50 
and 100 % family ownership as the sole method of classifying family firms. This approach 
emphasizes the power, authority, and legitimacy associated with family ownership (Carney 
2005), but overlooks that family involvement in general management and intention for intra-
family succession also make an impact on the nature of the business. Nevertheless, for both 
measures of economic growth using the minimum cutoffs of 40, 50, and 60 responses per state, 
the results are again consistent with our main analysis. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this paper, we attempt to explore how the prevalence of small- to medium-size family firms 
affects economic growth. We suggest that the proportion of family SMEs will have an inverted 
U-shaped relationship with economic growth. Our findings support the hypothesis that there is an 
optimum level of family SMEs in a local economy. Up to that point, which our analysis suggests 
to be about 42.8 % of the SME population, an increasing proportion of family firms have a 
positive influence on economic growth. How- ever, beyond that point, more and more family 
firms in the economy appear to reduce economic growth. This result suggests that a balanced 
combination of family and non-family SMEs can best maximize economic growth. 
 
We build our arguments upon the knowledge-based view of economic growth, i.e., how 
heterogeneity may increase knowledge asymmetry among market players, thereby facilitating 
knowledge spillover and economic growth. We contribute to the economic growth and small 
business literature by further exploring how governance archetypes may become one dimension 
of heterogeneity that stimulates economic growth. In addition, we also contribute to the family 
business literature by providing evidence that an optimal level of family SMEs stimulates 
economic growth. While previous studies largely focused on how family firms contribute to the 
economy (employment, GDP, etc.), to the best of our knowledge we are the first to explore how 
they affect the growth of the economy. Altogether, these contributions provide a more granular 
understanding of the role of family firms in economic growth. 
 
Aside from its contributions, our study has several limitations, which not only represent the 
boundaries of its insights, but also provide opportunities for future research. First, we examined 
the impact of the proportion of small- to medium-size family firms on economic growth. Indeed, 
owing to the fact that there is no existing database regarding the prevalence of family business in 
the USA, our study aggregates firm- level data from the annual survey of SBDC clients between 
2005 and 2009 in the USA. However, despite the size of our sample in aggregate, we rely on a 
relatively small number of firms per state and per year to make our estimates of the prevalence of 
family firms. Furthermore, we do not include large firms, which may be characterized by 
different behavioral dynamics and outcomes. For example, innovative activities and access to 
skilled human resources are different between small- and large-sized companies (Freel 2000; Tan 
et al. 2009; Tether 1998). Morck and Yeung (2004) also suggest that, in opposition to the 
economic well-being of society, very large family firms possess the power and inclination to 
engage in political rent-seeking, which tends to reduce rather than increase economic growth. 
Future scholars are therefore encouraged to take into account the roles of family and non-family 
firms of varying sizes when investigating how family involvement affects economic growth. 
 
Second, in recent years, family business researchers have increasingly recognized that family 
firms are heterogeneous (e.g., Chua et al. 2012; Westhead and Howorth 2007). However, the 
nature of our data made it difficult for us to differentiate between different types of family firms 
in terms of their effects on economic growth. Research is therefore needed to explore how 
different types of family firms may contribute to economic growth. Family involvement exerted 
through different ownership and management structures can lead to diverse behavior and firm 
performance (De Massis et al. 2013b), and this may, in turn, affect economic growth. For 
instance, prior studies show that founder-led firms (some of which may also be family firms) 
perform better than both late-generation family firms and non-family firms (Miller et al. 2007). 
Similarly, other work indicates that the proactive attitude of family firms changes over time as a 
function of firm age (De Massis et al. 2014). Moreover, as emphasized throughout this paper and 
in the family business literature in general, family firms are characterized by the coexistence of 
different sets of economic and noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al. 2012). How the proportion of 
family firms that are driven primarily by economic versus noneconomic goals affects economic 
growth deserves further investigation. 
 
Third, our study explores the impact of the proportion of family SMEs on economic growth in 
the USA. In general, we believe the basic tenet of the study—the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between family business prevalence and economic growth—should apply to all economies. 
Nevertheless, differences in legal structures, stages of economic development, cultures, and other 
factors may influence both the prevalence and economic impact of family firms (Gedajlovic et 
al. 2012; Morck and Yeung 2003, 2004). It would therefore be desirable to replicate our study 
across different countries. 
 
Fourth, following Chang et al. (2008), we use states as the basic unit in this longitudinal study. 
Nevertheless, there may be important variations within states such as the distinction between 
rural and metropolitan areas. Thus, using alternative units of analysis might offer other important 
insights. 
 
Finally, creation and generation of economic growth are among the top priorities of many 
governments worldwide. This study has therefore strong implications for policy making. 
Programs and funding that promote entrepreneurship and economic growth in both the developed 
and developing countries are increasing (Acs and Szerb 2007; Audretsch et al. 2015). However, 
the macroeconomic policies driving support and investment in small and medium enterprises 
appear to be based on the assumption that firms of comparable size have similar developmental 
needs and potentials. As a consequence, public policy programs usually segment potential firms 
according to size (employees and sales turnover) and/or industry. In effect, existing support 
programs lump family and non-family firms together into an ‘‘SME sector’’. This study suggests 
that family SMEs are distinct from non- family firms in economically significant ways. Our 
theory and evidence on the impact of the prevalence of family SMEs on economic growth is a 
first step toward alerting policy makers of the need for public policy to take into account the 
idiosyncratic characteristics and challenges of a very prevalent and relevant form of business 
organization. For example, family firms pursue a variety of economic and noneconomic goals 
that sometimes conflict and sometimes are complementary (Kotlar and De Massis 2013). The 
better these goals are understood and articulated, the better policy makers will be able to provide 
support programs for family business growth. If the current system fails to recognize the 
importance of small- to medium-size family firms and their idiosyncratic needs, economic 
growth could be adversely affected. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In sum, this study draws on the family business and knowledge-based literatures of economic 
growth to explain the impact of the prevalence of family firms on economic growth. The results 
show an inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of small- and medium-sized 
family firms and economic growth at regional level. Consistent with the idea that heterogeneity 
stimulates innovation and economic growth (Knott 2003) and a variety of firms of different types 
are needed to expand and transform the productive potential of a regional economy (Wennekers 
and Thurik 1999), our study shows that a balanced mix of family firms and non-family firms is 
better than either a dominant portion of family firms or portion of non- family firms. Since this 
has both theoretical and practical value, further work is needed to study how family firms impact 
their local economies, particularly as political leaders argue over effective policies to stimulate 
economic growth during times of recession. We hope our study stimulates future research on this 
complex, yet important topic. 
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